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In this paper, I present an approach to estimate worldwide industry-level non-tariff-barriers 
to trade (NTBs). The resulting data cover 160 countries and more than 200 industries. Ex-
pressed in terms of ad valorem tariff-equivalents, the data provide a comprehensive overview 
of the pattern of applied trade protection around the world. This is timely and important a) 
because NTBs make up the bulk of applied trade protection given that tariff-policies are in-
creasingly regulated by international obligations; and b) because systematic and reliable data 
on NTBs is not available due to the complexity of existing regulations and the largely non-
mandatory international reporting standards for these measures. Instead of relying on official 
data sources that may contain biased reporting, I therefore estimate the size of trade barriers 
from observable trade frictions. Specifically, I exploit observed trade frictions along with data 
on trade elasticities to identify the size of unobserved trade barriers. As a consequence of this 
indirect estimation method, my data are not affected by the self-selection and coverage prob-
lems prevalent in existing data sources on NTBs. My data are valuable for research in the areas 
of trade and trade policy and have broad implications for policy-making. 
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1     Introduction 
Trade barriers, both physical and manmade, strongly shape global trade and production patterns and, 
ultimately, affect the domestic economic, social, and political realities in globalized modern societies. 
                                                            
Department of Political Science, University of Zurich. Email: marco.martini@uzh.ch. I am grateful for 
helpful comments to Tim Betz, Fabian Bohnenberger, Bill Clark, Brendan M. Cooley, Lindsay Dolan, Rai-
mond Hicks, Hiau Looi Kee, Bob Kubinec, Sascha Langenbach, Arthur Lupia, Helen Milner, Peter Neary, 
Iain Osgood, Erica Owen, Scott Page, Amy Pond, Stephen Redding, Frank Schimmelfennig, Janina 
Steinmetz, Dustin Tingley, Andreas Wenger, and Jack Zhang. 
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In recent decades, reductions in shipping costs resulting from progress in transportation technology 
and logistics have accelerated the trend toward the international division of labor, outsourcing, and 
global supply chains. The decline in transport costs has gone in tandem with political efforts toward 
a liberalization of international trade. A series of multilateral trade rounds in the post-World War II 
era has resulted in significant reductions of tariff rates. These developments have resulted in sub-
stantial increases in global trade volumes and a deeper integration of the world economy.   
     Crucially, however, the decline in physical transport costs and tariffs has also greatly increased the 
use and importance of non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs). These non-tariff barriers to trade take the 
form of quotas, licenses, requirements, or various other regulations. With tariff-levels largely bound 
by international obligations, governments increasingly resort to this more diffuse set of measures to 
regulate international trade. Such efforts may well be aimed at accepted objectives such as enforcing 
labor standards, ensuring public health, or guaranteeing safety and security. There are widespread 
concerns, however, that NTBs are used to reintroduce protectionism through the backdoor and thus 
to freeride on previous trade agreements. A recent World Bank study, for instance, refers to NTBs 
as “Trade Policy’s New Frontier” (Cadot and Malouche 2012, also see: WTO 2012a).  
     Given the importance of NTBs for contemporary trade relations, reliable data on these measures 
and their and price-effects are of interest in many contexts. In particular, valid data on trade barriers 
are required for any trade policy analyses (Hertel 1997, Piermartini and The 2005, WTO 2012b). 
First, assessments of export growth opportunities and market potentials by countries and firms re-
quire valid information on trade barriers. Second, in the run-up to trade talks, the identification of 
negotiation priorities requires information on currently imposed trade barriers. Third, information 
on trade protection can also reduce political frictions and economic costs associated with trade dis-
putes because increased transparency reduces to need for fact-finding through costly arbitration. 
Finally, data on NTBs can help to monitor compliance with international agreements and thus even 
deter the implementation of discriminatory measures in the first place.   
     Moreover, data on NTBs are required to comprehensively assess the domestic welfare effects of 
trade policies. Using data on tariffs, transport costs, or aggregate trade openness indicators, a host of 
studies has shown that trade barriers not only affect production patterns (Díez 2014, Lee and Swagel 
1997), investment and innovation decisions (Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen 2016, Bustos 2011), 
economic growth (Yanikkaya 2003, Wacziarg and Welch 2008), and productivity (Amiti and Konings 
2007, Luong 2011). Trade barriers have also been shown to affect employment and wages (Galiani 
and Sanguinetti 2003, Gaston and Trefler 1994) as well as income and income inequality (Baier and 
Bergstrand 2001, Nicita 2004, Slaughter 2001). Without accounting for the bulk of applied trade 
protection in the form of NTBs, however, these results necessarily remain selective and cannot re-
flect an accurate picture of the economic and social consequences of current policies.  
     The key challenge for carrying out the above analyses in a comprehensive manner is that system-
atic and reliable data on NTBs is very difficult to obtain. This has to do in part with the reluctance 
of governments to give up their remaining wiggle room for setting trade policy. As a result, reporting 
standards have remained weak and the quality of existing data collections is poor. An additional 
complication arises because NTBs are such a non-homogeneous set of measures. Like tariffs, NTBs 
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raise the trade costs for foreign exporters and thereby discourage trade. Unlike tariffs, however, 
NTBs are not simply a tax on the value of imported goods, but affect prices in a more indirect 
manner. As a result of these factors, taking stock of applied levels of trade protection has become 
more difficult in recent decades.   
     This is directly reflected in the nature of existing collections of information on NTBs. All these 
collections rely on ‘bottom-up’ efforts to compile individual government regulations. Such collec-
tions, however, are likely (and in some case obviously) incomplete and biased due to selective gov-
ernment reporting, limited human resources, and the immense complexity of the subject matter. 
There is furthermore no way to systematically assess the stringency of individual regulations in these 
collections. As a result, it is neither clear whether, and, if yes, to what degree, a given regulation 
affects trade, nor how these effects can be assessed. Consequently, it is also not clear how any two 
regulations are comparable or whether regulations concerning specific issues, industries, or countries 
systematically differ from each other. 
     In this paper, I present an alternative ‘top-down’ approach to systematically compile data on ap-
plied product-level trade protection for a large number of countries. To do so, I use an statistical 
method to indirectly infer the levels of applied trade protection by individual countries across a wide 
range of products. The procedure uses information on the price-sensitivities of domestic consumers 
(that are reflected in trade elasticities) and information on observed trade frictions (that are assessed 
by comparing the value of imports to the value of domestically produced and consumed goods) to 
estimate the size of trade barriers. The underlying logic is that, when holding constant the price-
sensitivity of consumers and a host of other trade cost factors, low levels of imports compared to 
domestically produced and consumed goods imply high trade barriers.  
     My approach has two significant advantages over existing collections of information on NTBs. 
First, it does not rely on government reporting of trade barriers that may be incomplete and biased. 
Rather, the method focuses on the observable effects of these trade barriers, which necessarily ensue 
if a barrier effectively reduces trade flows. Second, my approach naturally results in a standardized 
estimate of the economic effects of applied barriers. This allows me to report the size of all trade 
barriers that affect a given industry-level trade flow into a given country in terms of ad valorem tariff-
equivalents (AVEs), i.e., as a percentage tax on the import price. My results therefore conveniently 
summarize and quantify the effects of a potentially diverse set of different measures in a simple, 
comparable, and easy to interpret manner.  
     The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing data on non-tariff 
barriers and their limitations in greater detail. Section 3 presents the theoretical and conceptual con-
siderations underlying my estimation strategy. The section introduces the gravity model of trade and 
discusses the underlying theory and assumptions. Section 4 describes the estimation strategy in detail 
and illustrates how a gravity approach can be used to estimate the size of NTBs given information 
on trade, domestic production, trade elasticities, and relevant trade-cost factors other than NTBs. 
Section 5 describes presents the results and discusses their validity. Section 6 provides a number of 
concluding remarks.  
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2     Background: Currently Available Information on Trade Barriers 
Given the increasingly important role of non-tariff barriers as trade policy instruments, the lack of 
reliable information on these measures has been a source of growing unease among trade researchers 
and practitioners alike. Two recent book-length reports published by the WTO and the World Bank, 
respectively, are devoted to the problem of non-tariff measures in modern trade relations and treat 
the issues of lacking transparency and insufficient documentation at length (Cadot and Malouche 
2012, WTO 2012a; also see: Bacchetta et al. 2012).  
     A number of factors contribute to the poor quality of data on NTBs compared to tariffs. First, 
there is a longer tradition of recording tariffs and governments have incentives to do so. Historically, 
tariffs were the primary instrument of trade policy while NTBs have come into focus much later 
than tariffs and efforts to classify and try and record these measures systematically have only started 
to pick up in the mid-1990s. Moreover, these efforts have been slow-moving not only because gov-
ernments have little interest in documenting potential violations to international trade rules, but also 
because doing so is costly. This is different in the case of tariffs, where governments always had an 
incentive to record transactions to collect tariff revenues. Yet because NTBs do not result in gov-
ernment revenue, no comparable incentives to document these measures exist.  
     Second, NTBs are more difficult to record than tariffs. Whereas tariffs are clearly defined import 
taxes, NTBs are heterogeneous policies comprising technical standards, quarantine restrictions, var-
ious kinds of quotas, licensing requirements, and so forth. Moreover, non-tariff barriers are not only 
more diffuse than tariffs in the form they take but also in how they create costs. Tariffs are straight-
forward costs that are paid at the port of landing and there are established and comparatively regu-
lated customs procedures involved in the process. In contrast, non-tariff barriers may affect imports 
not only at the border, but at various stages of the ‘trade route’ (including search and adaption costs, 
costs involved in complying with regulations during production, or restrictions on distribution and 
post-sales services). Given these considerations it is not surprising that the stiffness of NTBs is dif-
ficult to systematically assess. 
     Third, various policies that adversely affect trade serve legitimate purposes such as ensuring en-
vironmental protection, worker’s rights, or consumer health. It is, however, often difficult to distin-
guish valid concerns from protectionist intentions. In theory, the distinction is clear: As long as such 
regulations do not discriminate against imports but are equally binding for domestic producers, such 
policies are in conformity with WTO rules.1 The problem in practice is, of course, that the two 
variants are very difficult to tell apart. This problem does not arise with respect to tariffs, which are 
discriminatory by definition. On the one hand, this ambiguity makes NTBs particularly attractive 
policy tools for governments wishing to shield domestic industries. On the other hand, this means 
that observed regulations may very well be completely non-discriminatory and apply to domestic as 
well as foreign producers. Such measures would have no effect on trade.  
     Despite these difficulties in observing and assessing non-tariff barriers, various attempts have 
                                                            
1 In this regard, a distinction is sometimes made between non-tariff measures (NTMs), which are non-
discriminatory, and non-tariff barriers (NTBs), which are discriminatory. 
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been made to collect information on these measures. One of the earliest of these attempts was un-
dertaken by UNCTAD with the non-tariff branch of the TRAINS database. The database is large in 
terms of observations, but has long been known to suffer from severe inconsistencies (Rau and Vogt 
2017). It is also extremely unbalanced both cross-sectionally and over time. The project has been 
lying more or less dormant since the late 1990s as a result of these problems. Only in 2012 has 
UNCTAD published a new classification of NTMs and revamped its data collection efforts. The 
new data (mostly for the years 2012, 2013, and 2014) continue to be highly unbalanced however (for 
instance, there are over 40.000 entries for Argentina and close to zero for South Korea), and only 
come in binary form per HS 6-digit product (indicating whether a product is covered by some regu-
lation or not).  
     The second large database on NTMs comes from the WTO (accessible through the WTO’s new 
I-TIP portal) and contains measures that member states have notified to the WTO in accordance 
with their notification ‘requirements’. Because there is no enforcement mechanism aimed at ensuring 
compliance with these requirements, however, these data, too, are problematic at best. The WTO 
itself points out that “[n]otifications provide an incomplete and sometimes misleading account of 
the incidence of non-tariff measures” (WTO 2012a, p. 98). The quasi-voluntary nature of these re-
quirements allows governments to report innocent measures while withholding information on their 
more discriminatory policies. Bacchetta et al. (2012), for instance, state that “compliance appears to 
be generally low, except where Members have an own interest in complying” (p. 42).  
     In addition to the I-TIP portal, two further sources of information on NTBs have recently been 
made available by the WTO. The first concerns so-called specific trade concerns (STCs) voiced by 
member states. These are ‘reverse notification’ and may therefore be seen as more credible. The main 
problem of these datasets is that they are extremely limited in scope – on average containing only a 
handful of concerns per importer and relating only to sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) and 
technical barriers to trade (TBT). Furthermore, because there are many other channels through 
which governments can raise such concerns, these data, too, “may provide a distorted picture of the 
trade-restrictive or trade-distortive effects of TBT and SPS measures”  (WTO 2012a, p. 100). 
     Another WTO source of information on NTMs/NTBs is the recently published WTO Trade 
Monitoring database, which is coded from qualitative information taken from the WTO’s Trade 
Monitoring Reports since 2008. The database covers a somewhat larger number of measures than 
the STCs data but, as with the STCs data, its overall coverage is far from comprehensive.  
     Two additional concerns with all of the above sources are that considerable difficulties exist in a) 
assigning the correct HS product codes to qualitative information drawn from regulations, notifica-
tions, and reports, and b) identifying whether measures that used to be in force at some point have 
been terminated or not (also see: Bacchetta et al. 2012). These difficulties are understandable and 
perhaps inevitable given the size and complexity of the task. But they nonetheless raise additional 
doubts about the quality of the data thus obtained. Moreover, these difficulties often prohibit the 
use of these data in quantitative analyses, because the NTBs data cannot be matched with relevant 
data on trade flows and other relevant factors.   
     In combination, the above issues lead to a situation in which the available “data on NTMs is very 
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fragmentary” (Cadot and Malouche 2012, p. 3). Similarly, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) note 
that “[t]he grossly incomplete and inaccurate information on policy barriers available to researchers 
is a scandal and a puzzle” (p. 693). These problems are also reflected in gravity estimates in which 
the above data (insofar as HS industry codes are available) are included as a predictor for trade flows. 
One would expect a clear negative association between NTBs and trade volumes as is the case with 
tariff data. Instead, coefficient estimates are generally small, overwhelmingly statistically insignificant 
and occasionally even positive (see: Appendix A, which provides a complete list of empirical results 
for existing data sources).  
     In light of the above discussion – and given that NTBs are a) widely recognized as important 
impediments to trade, and b) the subject of the vast majority of WTO disputes – this is unlikely to 
accurately reflect the true significance of these measures in the context of modern trade relations.  
3     Quantifying Observable Trade Frictions: The Gravity Model of Trade 
Given the lack of suitable direct data on non-tariff barriers, I indirectly infer the size and pattern of 
NTBs from observable trade frictions using a gravity approach. Conceptually, the idea is to deduce 
the size of these barriers for any given importer and product from the ratio of international to do-
mestic trade – net of the effect of other trade cost factors such as distance or tariffs and of the effect 
of the elasticity of substitution. Put differently, if 𝑋  are exports from 𝑖 to 𝑗 in a given product 
category and 𝑋  are ‘exports’ from 𝑖 to itself (i.e., domestically produced varieties that are also sold 
domestically), then – after accounting for other trade cost factors – the ratio of 𝑋  to 𝑋  will reflect 
any additional trade frictions associated with exports to destination 𝑗. From these observed frictions 
and knowledge of the price-sensitivity of consumers, it is then possible to ‘reverse engineer’ the size 
of NTBs in country 𝑗. The gravity equation makes it possible to implement this intuition economet-
rically and to re-express implied non-tariff barriers in ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) – i.e., as percent-
age increases in price.  
     Gravity models have traditionally been used to quantify the effects of observed trade cost factors 
on trade flows (typically using on data on international trade). However, the reverse use of inferring 
unobserved trade costs from trade flows, so-called ‘border effects’, has become wide-spread practice 
since the pioneering work of McCallum (1995). McCallum’s goal was to assess the effect of the U.S.-
Canada border on trade flows by comparing trade among only U.S. States or only Canadian Prov-
inces to cross-border trade flows. While McCallum (1995) used subnational data on inter-state and 
inter-provincial trade, it has subsequently become common practice to calculate domestic trade as 
production minus total exports following Wei (1996). This is the approach I employ as well, as is 
discussed in more detail in the data section below.  
     It is useful to consider the theoretical underpinnings of the gravity model before dealing with the 
implementation and estimation details (for a useful discussion of both the theoretical and empirical 
aspects of the gravity model, see: Head and Mayer 2014). The gravity model makes it possible to 
estimate the effect of trade frictions, because it provides a “frictionless benchmark” (Anderson 2010, 
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p. 4) against which observed data can be compared. To see this, consider equation (1a) of the theo-
retical formulation of the gravity model due to Anderson and van Wincoop (2003):  
 𝑋 =  𝑌 𝐸𝑌  𝑡Π Ρ , 
where 
Π =  𝐸𝑌 𝑡Ρ  
and 
Ρ =   𝑌𝑌 𝑡Π . 
 
Without product and time subscripts, which are omitted for simplicity, the model can be thought of 
as representing total trade in a given year. Then 𝑋  are aggregate trade flows from country 𝑖, the 
exporter, to country 𝑗, the importer. 𝑌  is total exporter production, 𝐸  is total importer production 
proxying total expenditure, and 𝑌  is world total production. Next, 𝑡  is the sum of all bilateral trade 
costs (to be separated out below) expressed as a multiplicative factor. That is, if the sum of all trade 
costs amounted to 25 percent of the factory gate export price, then 𝑡 = 1.25. The parameter 𝜎 is 
the elasticity of substitution (see: Appendix B for a detailed description of my approach to estimate 
this parameter). Lastly, the terms Π  and Ρ   in equations (1b) and (1c) are ‘multilateral resistance’ 
(MR) price indices that relate bilateral trade costs 𝑡  for and given dyad 𝑖𝑗 to the (expenditure) 
weighted average of all other trade costs that 𝑖 (Π ) and 𝑗 (Ρ ) face when trading with other partners. 
These indices thus capture relative gravity effects and are discussed in some more detail below.  
     To see where the ‘frictionless benchmark’ comes in, consider the model only with the first term 
on the right-hand side of equation (1a), 𝑌 𝐸 𝑌⁄ , and ignore the second term. Further assume that 
country 𝑖 and country 𝑗 were the only countries in the world and that each country’s total production 
was equal to 50 units in some currency. So, 𝑋 = 𝑌 𝐸 𝑌⁄ = 50 × 50/100 = 2500/100 = 25. The 
model would predict exports of 25 currency units from country 𝑖 to country 𝑗. Because in this setup 
the model is symmetric, the reverse prediction would equal 25 currency units as well. Thus, the two 
countries consume half of their production at home and exchange the other half – just as if they 
were one large country and goods would be shipped back and forth at random. This logic extends 
to worlds populated with larger numbers of differently sized countries.2 
                                                            
2 Note that the model also makes convincing predictions concerning the relationship between trade openness 
and economic size. It is well known that small countries tend to be more open to trade than large countries 
trade because the latter trade more domestically simply as a result of their size. Consider a situation with two 
asymmetrically sized countries: 𝑋 = 𝑌 𝐸 𝑌⁄ = 80 × 20/100 = 1600/100 = 16. In the absence of trade 
costs the reverse prediction remains identical. So, the large country is predicted to export and import much 
less (16/80 = 20%) relative to its overall production, compared to the small country (16/20 = 80%). Natu-
rally, in a parameterized regression framework these relationships are more flexible and there is no need for 






     Next, consider the full model including the second term. The second term captures to what de-
gree trade costs lead to deviations from the frictionless scenario just discussed. The first thing to 
note is the prominent role played by the elasticity of substitution. Because the elasticity of substitu-
tion is restricted to be strictly greater than one (to rule out complementary relationships between 
varieties), the exponent as a whole is always negative, i.e., (1 − 𝜎) < 0. Because the ratio in brackets 
– the ‘network-adjusted’ trade costs – will typically be greater than one, the second term as a whole 
will be bounded between zero and one. Due to the multiplicative relationship between the two, the 
second term revises downward the frictionless benchmark prediction of the first term as a function 
of 𝜎 and the sum of all trade costs.  
     For concreteness, consider some numerical examples. Suppose relative trade costs, the fraction 
inside the brackets of the second term, were equal to 2. This implies that factory gate export prices 
of country 𝑖 producers double as a result of trade costs. The degree to which this increase in price 
dampens demand on the side of country 𝑗 consumers crucially depends on the elasticity of substitu-
tion. Supposing 𝜎 was equal to 3 so that (1 − 𝜎) = −2. Thus, the second term would equal 2  =  1/2 . The trade cost term would therefore be equal .25 and predicted trade flows would equal one 
quarter of the frictionless benchmark. Now suppose, consumers were much more price-sensitive 
and the elasticity of substation was 6 instead of 3. Then, (1 − 𝜎) = −5, and because trade costs still 
equal 2, the second term becomes 2 = 1/2 = 1/32 ≈  .03. Consequently, predicted trade flows 
amount to merely three percent of the frictionless benchmark scenario. Thus, identical trade costs 
can have varying effects depending on the price-sensitivity of consumers.   
     Note that the second term approaches one – and the frictionless benchmark is recovered – under 
two different circumstances. First, if the fraction inside the brackets approaches one, then the entire 
term approaches one because one to the power of anything is always one. This is not surprising, and 
indicates that trade costs that are absent should have no influence on trade flows (although the cor-
rect interpretation is a little more subtle given the ratio formulation of the bilateral and multilateral 
trade cost components). Second, if the elasticity of substitution approaches one, then the exponent 
approaches zero and anything raised to the power of zero also equals one. Put differently, if con-
sumers are highly price-insensitive and are willing to pay any price for a given variety of a product, 
then trade costs have no effect on trade flows either.  
     To conclude the discussion, a brief consideration of the multilateral resistance indices, Π  and Ρ  
is in order (equations 1b and 1c). Essentially, these terms reflect the larger network effects of inter-
national trade relations that go beyond the 𝑖𝑗 link. Intuitively, if the sum of bilateral trade costs 𝑡  
takes on some intermediate value, but both countries face considerably higher trade costs with all 
their remaining trade partners – for instance, because they are neighboring remote island states – 
then their multilateral resistance terms are large. As a result, the fraction 𝑡 /Π Ρ  becomes smaller, 
implying higher predicted trade flows 𝑋  than would be expected by considering 𝑡  in isolation. The 
same logic applies in reverse, for instance, when both countries have strong economic integration 
                                                            
interesting in this context that estimated coefficients in gravity models are well known to converge to values 
close to one. 
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agreements with other partners but not with each other. The MR terms thus capture part of the 
‘general-equilibrium’ component of international trade. They reflect the insight that, on a global scale, 
relative trade costs shape empirically observed trade patterns.  
4     Estimation Strategy: ‘Reverse Engineering’ the Size of Non-Tariff Barriers 
The above considerations carry over directly into the empirical specification of the model. Since the 
theoretical gravity equation is in multiplicative form, it needs to be transformed into a setup more 
suitable for estimation. Taking the logarithm of both sides of equation (1a) makes it possible to re-
express the theoretical model in linear-additive form. I further add time-subscripts and convert the 
trade and production variables to lower case (to reflect the fact that estimation is done on the dis-
aggregated level and separately for each product). The resulting product-level equation takes the 
following form:  
 ln𝑥 = − ln𝑦 +  ln𝑦 +  ln𝑦 + (1 − 𝜎)ln𝑡 − (1 − 𝜎)lnΠ − (1 − 𝜎)lnΡ , 
 
where now 𝑥  are product-level exports from country 𝑖 to 𝑗 at time 𝑡, 𝑦  and 𝑦  are industry-level 
production in 𝑖 to 𝑗 at time 𝑡, Π  and Ρ  are the multilateral resistance indices as above. The trade 
cost term, ln𝑡 , can be further specified as the combined effect of 𝑛 individual trade cost factors: 
 ln𝑡 = ln𝑡 = ln𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔 + 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔 + ln𝑡𝑎𝑟 + 𝑏 + 𝑏 . 
 
These are the dyadic trade cost factors that will be explicitly included in the empirical model pre-
sented below. The first three terms of equation (3) capture physical trade cost factors. In particular, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡  is the distance between countries 𝑖 and 𝑗 in kilometers, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔  is a dummy variable taking 
on a value of one if the countries share a common border and zero otherwise, and 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔  is a dummy 
indicating whether 𝑖 and 𝑗 share an official language. These factors only vary across country pairs but 
not over time. Next, 𝑡𝑎𝑟  is the bilateral tariff rate in a given year. The exact nature of these variables 
and the data sources are discussed in more detail below.  
     The primary variables of interest in the present context are the two border indicators 𝑏  and 𝑏 . Because the data contain observations of domestic trade in which 𝑖 = 𝑗, not all recorded trade 
flows cross international borders. If collapsed into a single variable, 𝑏 , would take on a value of one 
if the recorded flow pertains to cross-border trade between two countries and zero if the recorded 
flow pertains to domestic trade within a single country. The split version of 𝑏  as contained in the 
trade cost equation (3) simply separates the international component into two parts: 𝑏  takes on 
a value of one if the recorded flow pertains to any cross-border trade between two countries – except 
for exports to country 𝑗 = 𝑚. Similarly, 𝑏  takes on a value of one only if the recorded flow per-
tains to cross-border trade that involves country 𝑚 as a destination (i.e., importer). That is, the vari-





the product under consideration; 𝑏  can, therefore, be used to obtain an estimate of the stringency 
of these policies. Specifically, this can be done by estimating 
 ln𝑥 = 𝛼 + 𝜑 (1 − 𝜎)ln𝑡 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜎)𝑏 + 𝛾 +  𝛾 + 𝜀 ,  
 
where 𝛼 is an intercept, 𝛽 is the regression coefficient on the primary variable of interest and 𝜑  
through 𝜑  are the regression coefficients on the remaining 𝑛 − 1 trade costs variables, 𝛾  and 𝛾  
are time-varying exporter and importer fixed effects and 𝜀  is an error term that is assumed to be 
log-normal. With an eye to the further discussion also define 
 𝛽 ≡ 𝛽(1 − 𝜎). 
 
Equation (4a) follows directly from (2) and (3). To see this, note that the production variables and 
the multilateral resistance terms are monadic country-year level predictors and are therefore con-
tained within the two time-varying country fixed effects. As a result, only the dyadic trade cost factors 
from (3) remain as explicit variables in the model. This is fortunate, in particular, because the fixed 
effects specification is by far the most convenient way around a host of observational and modeling 
problems related to treatment of the multilateral resistance indices (as well as other forms of unob-
served heterogeneity).  
     The fixed effects specification I use has the additional advantage of accounting for other forms 
of unobserved heterogeneity that is clustered at the country-year level. Several of the trade cost fac-
tors listed in the introduction – such as the state of transport infrastructure, the quality of the legal 
system, or the political stability in the importing country – are appropriately dealt with in this way. 
The same is true for importer-specific shocks to tastes or income, and exporter-specific production 
shocks. The explicitly included dyadic variables capture further important aspects. Apart from ac-
counting for physical trade cost determinants, the distance, contiguity, and language variables are 
expected to account for important cultural differences as well because both physical and linguistic 
proximity are likely to be related to cultural proximity.  
     With tariffs as an observable policy barrier component also accounted for, it is therefore reason-
able to expect that a considerable share of any remaining international trade frictions is attributable 
to non-tariff policy barriers (one limitation of the method is that the separate product-by-product 
estimation setup makes it impossible to account for characteristics that only vary between products – 
in particular, the relative transportability of products. I come back to this point below). The size of 
these NTBs then can be inferred from the estimated coefficients on the border indicator 𝑏 . 
Conceptually, the coefficient on the border indicator picks up the residual deviation from the theo-
retical baseline prediction of the gravity model as discussed above after accounting for a host of 
other trade cost factors.  
     To see how this works in detail, first consider once more the case when the two border dummies 





international border and zero otherwise, the estimated coefficient is equal to ln𝑥 − ln𝑥 , 
which is equivalent to ln(𝑥 /𝑥 ). Exponentiating thus provides the time- and importer-aver-
aged ratio of the size of international to domestic trade flows of a given product after accounting for 
the other factors discussed above. The coefficient, therefore, can be interpreted as a conditional 
average reflecting how large international trade is relative to domestic trade for a given product, all 
else equal. It can be seen as a measure of the general restrictiveness of the international trade network 
to trade in the given product. 
     The same logic applies to the importer-specific variable 𝑏  only that in this case the coefficient 
reflects the specific trade restrictiveness of importer 𝑚 – while the average restrictiveness of all re-
maining countries is reflected by the coefficient on 𝑏 . For instance, if the estimated coefficient 
on 𝑏  was equal to –2, then because exp (−2) ≈ 0.13, this would imply that the amount of goods 
other countries export to country 𝑚 is on average equal to 13 percent of what these countries trade 
domestically.  
     The important point to note, however, is that empirically observed trade frictions cannot be di-
rectly used to infer the size of non-tariff barriers in a given country 𝑚. The reason is that observed 
trade frictions are not only determined by policy barriers, but also by the price-sensitivity of consum-
ers. Intuitively, if country 𝑚 imposes high NTBs on a given product but consumers in country 𝑚 
are willing to pay high prices for different imported varieties of that product, then observed trade 
frictions should be moderate. Conversely, if country 𝑚 maintains only very moderate NTBs but 
consumers are extremely price-sensitive, then observed trade frictions should be large despite the 
moderately-sized policy barriers. Thus, observed trade frictions alone do not provide sufficient in-
formation to assess the intrinsic severity of policy barriers because the effectiveness of policy barriers 
depends not only on the barriers themselves but also on the substitutability between domestic and 
foreign product varieties.  
     This problem is readily apparent from equation (4a) and directly follows from the theoretical 
formulation of the gravity model discussed in section 3. In this setup, the parameter of interest is 𝛽, 
but the parameter resulting from the actual estimation is 𝛽 = 𝛽(1 − 𝜎) as defined in equation (4b) 
because observed trade frictions depend on both the underlying NTBs and the price-sensitivity of 
consumers. In a certain sense, therefore, the coefficient estimates on 𝑏  are ‘theoretically con-
taminated’ because the estimates reflect the combined influence of two factors – the actual trade 
barrier and the elasticity of substitution. Given information on the elasticity of substitution, however, 
it is straightforward to obtain the parameter of interest (i.e., Anderson and van Wincoop 2003). In 
particular, the ad valorem equivalent of the underlying policy barrier can be calculated as  
 𝑁𝑇𝐵 𝐴𝑉𝐸 /100  =  exp(𝛽) − 1 =  exp 𝛽1 − 𝜎 − 1. 
 
The logic is as follows: if 𝛽 = −2, as in the above example, and 𝜎 = 4, then −2/(1 − 4) ≈ 0.67. 




product variety is in effect multiplied by 1.95 as a consequence of the non-tariff barrier and therefore 
results in an import price that is 1.95 − 1 = .95 = 95% higher than the original export price. The 
implied ad valorem equivalent of the underlying trade barrier is therefore estimated to be 95 percent.   
     It is worth noting that, for a given level of observed trade frictions, 𝛽, higher values of the elasticity 
of substitution result in lower estimated NTBs, and vice versa. The intuition is that if consumers are 
extremely price-sensitive (i.e., high 𝜎), then even a very moderate policy barrier will have a consider-
able effect on observed trade flows. On the other hand, if consumers are willing to pay almost any 
price (low 𝜎) for foreign varieties of a product, then very stiff barriers are required to achieve the 
same level of observable trade frictions. It follows that for any given level of trade frictions, the 
higher the value of 𝜎, the lower the implied NTBs.  
5     Non-Tariff Barriers: Data, Estimation, and Results 
In order to implement the above estimation procedure, data on trade, tariffs and production are 
required – all at the product level and over time – as well as dyadic data on distances, contiguity, and 
official languages. The following paragraphs briefly describe these data and their sources.  
     Trade data come from different sources. First, the bulk of the data on trade in the agricultural 
and manufacturing sectors is taken from the UN Comtrade database. Depending on data availability, 
Comtrade provides up to two reports for each trade flow – the export flow 𝑥  as reported by ex-
porter 𝑖, and the mirror import flow 𝑚  as reported by importer 𝑗. Second, the UNCTAD Trains 
database – from which the data on tariffs is taken – also reports import trade values for these sectors. 
While most of this data is taken from Comtrade and thus identical with the 𝑚  report, UNCTAD 
also occasionally reports data from the WTO IBD database. Third, data on trade in services is taken 
from the UN Service Trade database as well as from the OECD’s ‘Statistics on International Trade 
in Services’ database. 
     As a result of the multiple data sources, there may be up to three different entries per trade flow. 
This is helpful to alleviate missing data concerns. At the same time, it raises the question of how to 
combine multiple reports into a single figure. I follow the simple strategy of using the maximum 
value in cases where several entries for a single flow are available. The reasoning is that under-re-
porting seems likely to be a much more severe problem in trade statistics than over-reporting. Po-
tential reasons for under-reporting include capacity constraints on the side of customs authorities as 
well as incentives of buyer and sellers to evade tariff and tax collection. In contrast, systematic rea-
sons for over-reporting are much less evident.  
     Production data is required to derive the volume of domestic trade, which is calculated as the 
value of production minus the value of total exports in each product category, following Wei (1996) 
as noted above. Production data also come from different sources. Data on agricultural production 
is taken from the Food and Agricultural Organization’s (FOA) ‘Value of Agricultural Production’ 
database. Data on manufacturing production comes from the INDSTAT4 2013 database compiled 
by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Finally, data on production 
in services comes from the OECD’s ‘Structural Analysis Statistics (STAN)’ database.   
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     The need for production data constrains the level of granularity at which the analysis can be 
carried out. Production data is simply not available at a level of aggregation similar to the HS 6-digit 
categories in which trade and tariff data is reported (i.e., more than five thousand product categories). 
To be more specific, data on agricultural production is on the HS 4-digit level, data on production 
in the manufacturing sector is on the ISIC Rev. 3 4-digit level, and data on service sector production 
is on the ISIC Rev. 3 2-digit level.3   
     The time coverage of the data ranges in theory from 1988 to 2012. However, as a result of a large 
share of missingness in the earlier years and sparse data coverage in the UNIDO data after 2010, the 
vast majority of observations span the second half of the 1990s and the 2000s.  
     Finally, the data on distances, geographic contiguities, and official languages come from the grav-
ity datasets provided by CEPII (Head et al. 2010, Mayer and Zignago 2011). Because the estimation 
setup includes domestic trade, that is observations with 𝑖 = 𝑗, it is necessary to have domestic ana-
logues for all trade cost variables that are explicitly included in the model. This requires, in particular, 
a measure of distance that is comparable for domestic distances within countries and international 
distances between countries. This rules out the use of standard distance measures such as the distances 
between capital cities, if one does not want to implicitly assume that domestic trade costs related to 
distance are zero.   
     Fortunately, CEPII provide an appropriate measure that allows for consistent comparisons be-
tween domestic and international distances. Specifically, the measure is calculated as the population-
weighted distance between major cities, where these cities serve as proxies for the economic centers 
between which goods are traded both domestically and internationally. This approach makes it pos-
sible to directly compare the average weighted distance between cities within a country to the average 
weighted distance between cities across countries (for a detailed description see: Head and Mayer 
2002). The adaption of the contiguity and language variables is straightforward. A country is neces-
sarily contiguous with itself, so the contiguity variable takes on a value of one for observations in 
which 𝑖 = 𝑗. The same logic holds for official languages. Finally, domestic tariffs are equal to zero.4   
     The estimation is done separately by product 𝑘 to obtain product-specific results. Within each 
product category, I then iterate through countries 𝑗 in order to get importer-product specific esti-
mates for each importer. Thus, the estimation is repeated 𝑗 times with changing constellations of the 
variables 𝑏  and 𝑏 , where 𝑗 is the number of importers in the product-specific subset of the 
data. Overall, the data contains information on 160 importing countries and 211 different products 𝑘 in the mixed HS-ISIC classification. Naturally, not all 𝑗 × 𝑘 theoretically possible combinations are 
contained in the data, both because not all countries import all products and because the data is 
incomplete due to missingness. Nonetheless, the procedure results in a total of 11,563 estimated 
                                                            
3 Data on services is generally only available at a relatively coarse aggregation level. This is also true for data 
on trade in services. 
4 Tariffs on service trade are equally set to zero. Tariffs do not apply to trade in services primarily because 
services do not pass through customs. Service barriers typically come in the form of investment restrictions 




NTB ad valorem equivalents. 
     The estimated NTBs can be seen as over-time averages of importing countries’ most-favored 
nation (MFN) non-tariff import policies.5 In other words, the estimates reflect the general openness 
or restrictiveness of a country’s product-specific import policies that affect all exporters alike (see: 
Gowa and Hicks (2012) for a discussion of possible limitations of this assumption).  
     Table 6.1 exemplarily shows the results of two of 11,563 analyses run to obtain these estimates. 
These results relate to Brazil’s imports of pork (H_0203, with 0203 being the 4-digit HS code for 
pork) and photographic equipment (I_3320, with 3320 being the 4-digit ISIC Rev. 3 code for optical 
instruments and photographic equipment). The first column for each product category shows the 
global results with 𝑏  and 𝑏  collapsed into a single indicator 𝑏 , as indicated by the heading 
‘WLD’ (for ‘world’). The second set of columns shows the results for Brazil as country 𝑚.  
     The coefficient estimates of 𝑏  that are of primary interest are reported at the bottom of the 
table. As one would expect, the overall pattern of the estimates changes only slightly with the change 
in the border indicator from the WLD to the BRA setting. As indicated by the much larger negative 
coefficients on the border indicators, pork trade (with pork being a typical agricultural product) ap-
pears to be considerably more restricted than trade in optical and photographic products (which are 
sophisticated manufactures), both on the world scale and with respect to Brazil. This result is in line 
with expectations and also reflected in the coefficient estimates on the tariff variable.6 
     From the estimated coefficients, the implied Brazilian non-tariff barriers can be calculated as de-
scribed above. The elasticities of substitution – as obtained from the procedure described in Appen-
dix B – for pork and photographic equipment are 5.34 and 2.78, respectively. Consequently, for pork 
the estimate is exp(−5.78/(1 − 5.43)) − 1 = 2.79 =  279%, and for photographic equipment the es-
timate is exp(−0.83/(1 − 2.78)) − 1 = 0.56 = 56%.7   
The figures presented in Table 1 are representative of the overall results. The average R-squared 
across all analyses is slightly below 0.78 (which is no unusual value for gravity-type regressions). The 
average number of observations per product sub-dataset is 12,925 including the time-series, with the 
average number of years covered being 21.5 (although, as noted above, the early years are un-
derrepresented, so there is no even coverage across these years). 
 
                                                            
5 In WTO parlance, MFN is the tariff rate that members grant to all other members equally (leaving aside 
preferential trade agreements). The concept is based on the idea of non-discrimination so that all WTO mem-
bers are equally ‘most-favored’ by each other. 
6 One thing to note in this context is that the coefficients on the global estimates for 𝑏  and 𝑏  in the 
photographic equipment category are not statistically significant. However, the purpose here is not the test 
whether international trade volumes are different from domestic ones but to assess how the two relate and to 
use this information to infer trade frictions. For this reason, the p-value is not necessarily the relevant statistic 
to consider with respect to the border indicators. Basically, a precise coefficient estimate of exactly 0 would 
be highly informative (although not statistically significant) because it implies that international trade in the 
given product is just as open as domestic trade and therefore that implied NTBs are equal to zero – conditional 
on all other trade cost factors. 
7 As noted above, because higher elasticities imply lower barriers, these results would diverge more strongly if 
they were calculated using, say, the mean of the two elasticities. 
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Table 1: Exemplary Gravity Estimates for Brazil’s Pork and Photographic Equipment Imports 
 H_0203: Pork meat  I_3320: Opt. & photogr. equipment 


















































 – –0.831** 
(0.270) 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑡, 𝑗𝑡 𝑖𝑡, 𝑗𝑡  𝑖𝑡, 𝑗𝑡 𝑖𝑡, 𝑗𝑡 𝑁 ∗ 𝑇 12,365 12,365  16,800 16,800 𝑅   0.724 0.799  0.791 0.810 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is ln (1 + 𝑥 ). The constant of 1 is added to avoid taking logarithms of zeros of 
which some are reported in the data; similarly for tariffs, where the prevalence of zeros is considerably more pro-
nounced. The fixed effects are directional, i.e., there are two fixed effects per dyad-year; the intercept and fixed 
effects coefficients are not reported. Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the .001, .01 and .05 levels, respectively. 
 
Overall, some 86 percent of estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
When only considering the coefficients on the 𝑏  indicator, this number drops to 64 percent. As 
noted in footnote 5, however, p-values may not be the most informative statistic in the present 
context. As the further discussion highlights, it is far from uncommon (at least in the manufacturing 
sector) that international and domestic trade are comparably open. 
5.1 A Descriptive Overview of the Estimated Non-Tariff-Barriers  
To give a more systematic overview of the results, Table 4 (which, due to its length, is appended at 
the end of this paper) presents the trade-weighted average NTB ad valorem equivalents (based on 
import values) across all importers for an extended selection of products.8 The complete list is pro-
vided in Appendix C. Figure 1, graphically summarizes the complete set of results as contained in 
the appendix and provides some general insights.  
     Figure 1 and Table 4 allow an assessment of the plausibility of the results by comparing the esti-
mated NTBs to prior expectations about the restrictiveness of trade relations for different products. 
                                                            
8 In the calculation of these averages, I discard a handful of estimates that are larger than 3000 percent. These 
estimates concern almost exclusively developing countries and appear to be mostly the result of reporting 
error in the production data. 
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Both the figure and the table are split in three broad segments relating to agricultural products, man-
ufactures, and services. In the table, two different versions of the estimates are provided. The first 
column gives the raw estimates as calculated following the procedure described above (this series 
that is also displayed in Figure 1). However, it is fairly common in the manufacturing sector that 
goods are traded more intensively across international borders than domestically (conditional on 
trade costs). For this reason, I truncate these estimates at zero because not doing so would imply 
that countries actively subsidize imports. The interpretation therefore is that trade relations that are 
at least as open as domestic trade are considered free of policy barriers.  
     The second column provides an alternative measure, which simply rescales the raw estimates to 
a different benchmark. In doing so, I select for each product the importer with the lowest estimated 
NTBs and define this importer as the free-trader. I then rescale the estimates so that the free-trader 
has NTBs of zero and all other countries have NTBs larger than zero. This rescaling preserves the 
relative differences between the estimates and only leads to slight shifts in the overall weighted-
average depending on how large the trade share of the free-trader is. The interpretation here is that 
the free-trader defines the product-specific standard of when trade is considered to be free. I refer 
to the first version as ‘domestic-trade benchmarked’ and to the second as ‘free-trade benchmarked’. 
 




The overall pattern of results is clear. It is readily apparent that the estimated NTBs in the manufac-
turing sector tend to be much lower than those in both the agricultural and services sectors. This is 
fully in line with prior expectations given that the agricultural sector is well-known to be strongly 
protected across countries and trade liberalization efforts in the services sector have only picked up 
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speed comparatively recently. With respect to individual products, the results align with intuition as 
well. The only estimates that are unexpected concern coke oven products (I_2310), and cement and 
stone (I_2694, I_2695, I_2696). The estimates for these products appear overly high. This is a direct 
consequence of the very low weight-to-value ratios of these products, which drastically reduce their 
transportability. As noted above, the product-wise estimation procedure cannot account for these 
product-level characteristics. For products with more representative weight-to-value ratios, however, 
this issue appears to be of less concern.  
     In the transport sector, for instance, the estimated NTBs suggest that both shipbuilding (I_3511) 
and the railway industry (I_3520) are relatively closed. This mirrors prior knowledge suggesting that 
these industries (and the large national wharfs in particular) are much less internationally integrated 
than, for instance, the auto and aviation sectors. High NTBs are also estimated for nuclear fuel 
(I_2330) and weapons and ammunition (I_2927), which are clearly among the most strongly regu-
lated manufacturing industries. Publishing and printing (I_2211, I_2221), both of which are strongly 
nationally-oriented industries, attain high estimates as well.  
     The implied levels of protection in the textile and apparel sector are potentially lower than one 
would expect. It should be kept in mind, however, that these products are already shielded by some 
of the highest tariffs among all manufacturing goods. In the services sector, the pattern of results 
conforms very well with intuition: By far the lowest estimates relate to air transport (I_6200), fol-
lowed by research and development (I_7300), while the highest estimates concern construction 
(I_4500), and public administration and defense (I_7500). This is close to what one would expect. 
     When turning to importer-specific estimates, an intuitive pattern emerges as well. Japan, for in-
stance, is known for its stringent rice (H_1006) import policies. The country’s NTBs for rice are 
estimated at 318 percent (using the domestic-trade benchmark). Similar figures are obtained for other 
large rice producers such as India (260 percent), or Indonesia (268 percent). This compares to esti-
mates of 149 percent for Mexico, 25 percent for Italy, 20 percent for Spain, or 7 percent for Argen-
tina. The picture looks much different for corn (H_1005). Here Japan’s estimated NTBs are zero 
percent (truncated), while Mexico’s are 270 percent. Similarly, Argentina’s NTB estimate for soy 
beans (H_1201) is at 361 percent, while the estimate for the European Union is 156 percent. Con-
versely, when considering rape seed (H_1205), the oilseed variant dominant in Europe, the reverse 
result is found with an estimated 266 percent for Argentina and 443 percent for the EU.9  
     The overall pattern that emerges from these comparisons is that in the agricultural sector, large 
producers tend to have high estimated NTBs. In contrast, the opposite pattern is discernable in 
manufacturing trade. Here, large producers tend to be most open to trade. This general picture cor-
responds directly with theoretical expectations and prior knowledge about the dynamics of agricul-
tural and manufacturing trade: In the agricultural sector, where producers face direct competition 
from very similar imported product varieties, lobbying for protection is strong. On contrast, in the 
                                                            
9 Estimates for the European Union are obtained by calculating the trade-weighted averages for all member 
states. Imports are summed over time before transforming them into weights. This makes it possible to take 
into account the changing composition of the EU. Members that joined the EU later receive lower weights 
because their imports are summed over shorter time-periods. 
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manufacturing sector, where producers sell differentiated products in segmented markets and global 
supply chains are of major importance, calls for protection are much less frequent.     
     It is worth pointing out that the data resulting from the above estimation results constitute the 
most comprehensive and detailed information on NTBs that is currently available. This is true for 
the amount of detail on the product level as well as for the country coverage.  
5.2 Systematically Assessing the Estimated Non-Tariff-Barriers 
This subsection presents two more systematic sets of checks to substantiate the validity of the paper’s 
results. First, it presents additional gravity estimates that demonstrate the trade depressing effect 
captured by the estimated NTBs. Secondly, it briefly presents some evidence that the estimated non-
tariff barrier estimates vary systematically and in intuitive ways with a country’s industry-level import 
tariffs, its competitiveness, and the number of WTO filings brought against it.  
     Concerning the first part of the section, the following analysis presents results for gravity esti-
mates that directly include the acquired NTBs as a predictor, rather than as a result of the estimation 
procedure. This serves as a primary check that the method actually picks up on trade depressing 
variation in the data.  
     Prior to presenting the estimation results, I discuss the data structure used in the analysis and 
explain the rationale behind the data setup and research design choices made. The most far-reaching 
of these choices is to collapse the twenty-five year time-series data, ranging from 1988 to 2012, into 
a cross-section. This is done because the data on NTBs come as a cross-section as a result of the 
above estimation strategy. Since the over-time variation, along with the variation across exporters, 
has been used to estimate the NTBs, the resulting data are on the importer-industry level. Conse-
quently, the NTB estimates do not vary over time. Therefore, they cannot be adequately matched 
with the U.S. trade enforcement data or the trade data to be used in a time-series cross-sectional 
analysis unless one is willing to repeat the same barrier estimate for each year and then perform a 
pooled analysis. 
     The following briefly presents the more technical details of the aggregation procedure. The data 
that need to be aggregated for the analysis below are the time-varying economic data on trade and 
GDP. A feature of economic data is that these data are measured in monetary units (i.e., in U.S. 
dollars). Such data are customarily reported in current rather than constant U.S. dollars and thus reflect 
the nominal currency values of the respective reporting year. As a result, current U.S. dollar time-
series data include the effect of price inflation. The data shows an increasing trend that is due not 
only to economic growth but also to inflation. It is therefore necessary to inflation-adjust the data 
prior to calculating time-averages in order to translate all data in comparable constant U.S. dollar terms.  
     To do so, I use GDP deflators taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database to inflation-adjust the current data value series. Thus, all price-adjustments are made using 
general economy-wide inflation-measures for each country, irrespective of whether the series con-
cern aggregated data (such as total trade or production) or disaggregated data (such as industry-level 
trade or production). Ideally, one would want to adjust all data-series with disaggregated deflators 
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because prices for different products do not necessarily move in parallel within an economy. Possible 
alternatives to GDP deflators that allow more disaggregated price-adjustments are consumer and 
producer price indices (CPIs and PPIs) and trade unit values (UVs). However, both of these options 
have considerable disadvantages compared to GDP deflators.  
     While national statistical offices in many developed countries provide relatively detailed consumer 
and producer price indices (CPIs and PPIs), such indices are typically not available for developing 
countries. Moreover, national price indices differ in classifications and level of detail, leading to con-
siderable comparability issues. The OECD provides a set of harmonized CPIs and PPIs for member 
states based on individual national versions of these indices. However, because harmonization makes 
it necessary to considerably aggregate all national indices to find the ‘smallest common denominator’ 
of the respective product groupings, the resulting indices typically only include a handful of product 
groups. In addition, the OECD indices do not cover developing countries and are therefore not 
globally applicable.  
     Trade unit values have the advantage of being available at highly disaggregated product-levels. At 
the same time, however, they are an unreliable measure of price developments due to considerable 
measurement error. The issue of measurement errors is much more important in the context of price 
deflation than in the context of estimating elasticities. In the latter setting, UVs are used in a statistical 
context so that some of the measurement errors may cancel out or are stabilized in the statistical 
averaging procedure. In contrast, when used for price-deflation of, say, product-level trade data, each 
individual UV is matched with a single corresponding dyad-product-year observation. Thus, meas-
urement error is fully propagated into the ‘price-adjusted’ trade value. This can lead to severe biases 
especially for developing countries for which measurement error in UVs is most pronounced. 
     The above considerations significantly lower the attractiveness of CPIs/PPIs and UVs relative to 
GDP deflators. The latter have the great advantage of being available for all countries and fully 
reliable on average, that is, they adequately reflect general country-specific price movements over 
time. This is a sufficient property for the current purpose which simply seeks to construct reasonably 
valid over-time averages that do not depend on getting precise annual estimates. In contrast, if one 
would like to investigate the details of say production growth in a given country-industry over time 
(for instance as function of industry investments or R&D activities, or in relation to unemployment 
rates), the specific year-to-year changes would be of direct interest. In the former case, individual 
annual changes matter much less than the general price trend, which in turn is likely to be adequately 
captured by GDP deflators. 
     Additional processing is required to construct data for the European Union. Because Brussels is 
responsible for EU trade policy, the European Union as such rather than individual member states 
is the political entity of interest. Trade, production, and GDP data, where not directly available, are 
aggregated by summing the individual annual figures for all member states prior to the above defla-
tion and averaging procedure. In this context, the varying membership of the EU over time is taken 
into account. NTB data is calculated as the trade-weighted average of individual member state esti-
mates as described in footnote 8.  
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     With these aggregation procedures implemented, it is possible to proceed to the statistical analy-
sis. This analysis serves to establish the trade depressing effect of the estimated NTB measures. The 
general gravity model structure is similar to the setup employed above. That is, I estimate a log-log 
regression of trade on a set of gravity and trade cost variables and a set of up to three fixed-effects 
that takes the form 
 ln𝑥 = 𝛼 + 𝛼 ln (1 + 𝑦 ) + 𝛽 ln𝑡 + 𝛾 +  𝛾 +  𝛾 + 𝜀 , 
 
where 𝑥  are deflated time-averaged exports in industry 𝑘 from exporter 𝑖 to importer 𝑗, 𝑦  is 
deflated time-averaged production in industry 𝑘 in country 𝑗, 𝛼  is an intercept, 𝛼  and 𝛽  through 𝛽  are regression coefficients (as before, the tilde indicates the composite coefficient that includes 
the elasticity of substitution), 𝛾 , 𝛾 , and 𝛾  are a differing set of fixed-effects to be specified more 
precisely below, and 𝜀  is an error term that is assumed to be log-normal. Lastly, the trade cost 
term, ln𝑡 , is 
 ln𝑡 = ln (1 + 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟 ) + ln𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔 + 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔 . 
 
Despite the similarity to the model in equation (4), there are a number of differences. First, data 
contain information on all industries. Thus, a joint model is estimated instead of estimating separate 
models for each industry. The industry classification remains the same as before (see: Appendix D 
for details). Second, unlike in the setup above, where observations relating to countries’ domestic 
trade were included, the data now only contains information on international trade. Since the purpose 
is to estimate the effect of an (now) observed measure of trade barriers on international trade – rather 
than to compare domestic to international trade in order to indirectly infer the size of implied trade 
barriers – this choice is natural. As a direct consequence, all trade flows in the data refer to flows that 
cross national borders so that no border indicators are included in the model.  
     The trade cost term now contains a new variable, 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟 , which is the sum of the NTB ad 
valorem estimate for industry country 𝑗 in industry 𝑘 and the corresponding tariff (if available), which 
is in ad valorem terms by definition (I use the ‘free-trade benchmark’ version of the NTB data; this 
choice is inconsequential as results with the domestic benchmark data are very similar). The variable 
thus captures the total ad valorem policy barrier a country implements in any given industry. The 
combination of the NTBs and tariff data into a single barrier measure reflects the theoretical consid-
eration that the two kinds of measures in tandem form the politically imposed trade cost component 
that matters in the context of trade disputes (this is also the measure that serves as the basis for the 
trade policy simulations described below). Practically, however, the NTB data by far outweigh the 
trade depressing effect of tariffs as discussed more extensively below.  
     The 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 , 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔 , and 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔  variables that measure geographical distance, land contiguity, 
and common official language are defined as before. The only difference relates to the distance 





Zignago 2011) do not contain distance measures for the EU, I approximate these distances by cal-
culating the trade-weighted distance of non-EU countries to the EU-15 member states. The EU-15 
is chosen in order to capture representative distances to the ‘average EU’ in the time-averaged cross 
section.  
     Table 2 presents the results of the analysis in a number of different specifications. The first two 
columns show estimates for the entire world trade network, that is, for trade between all countries 
in each direction. To provide a more disaggregated picture, columns three and four show estimates 
only for the subset of unidirectional trade from the United States to its trade partners. The two 
specifications (a and b) for each of the two sets of data differ only in the form of the included fixed-
effects. Because the estimated NTBs that form the basis for the 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟  variable are on the im-
porter-industry level, I cannot include industry-varying importer effects, 𝛾  , in any of the models.  
 
Table 2: Gravity Results Assessing Previously Estimated NTBs on World and U.S. trade 
 World Trade Network  U.S. Exports 







































 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑘, 𝑗 𝑘 𝑖𝑘, 𝑘, 𝑗  𝑗 𝑘 𝑘, 𝑗 = 𝑖𝑗  𝑁 222,139 222,139  4,758 4,758 𝑅   0.702 0.723  0.814 0. 859 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is logged industry-level trade, ln (1 + 𝑥 ). The constant of 1 is added to avoid taking 
logarithms of zeros of which some are reported in the data; similarly for policy barriers. Industry (𝑘) and importer 
World Bank income group (𝑗 ) or importer/dyad (𝑖𝑗) fixed-effects are included as indicated; the intercept and 
fixed-effects coefficients are not reported. Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the .001, .01 and .05 levels, respectively. 
 
To partially account for unobserved heterogeneity at these levels, I either specify separate industry 
and importer effects 𝛾   and 𝛾  , or use industry-varying importer income group effects, 𝛾  , where 
income groups are defined based on the World Bank’s classification of countries according to high, 
upper middle, lower middle, and low income groups. The rational in the latter case is to account for 
product-specific unobserved heterogeneity that is related to development status and to thereby cap-
ture an important aspect of relevant importer characteristics. Also, as a result of the inability to spec-
ify industry-varying importer effects, I include industry-specific importer production, 𝑦 , as a gravity 
variable (while industry-specific exporter production, 𝑦 , is soaked up in the 𝛾   in the world model 
and 𝛾  in the U.S. exports model). Because the U.S. exports model only has one exporter, namely  
the United States, importer effects 𝑦  are equivalent to dyad effect 𝑦  in this context.  
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     The estimates in Table 2 show that policy barriers are a significant hurdle to trade in general and 
to U.S. exports in particular. Because, unlike before, the focus is not on inferring unobserved trade 
barriers from observed frictions, the coefficient interpretation follows the standard logic of inter-
preting log-log regression models. In approximation, the coefficient estimates for continuous pre-
dictors can be interpreted as the percentage change in trade in response to a given percent change in 
the predictors. That is, a 𝛿 percent change in 𝑥 implies a 𝛽𝛿  percent change in 𝑦. Similarly, for 
dummy variables the coefficients are approximately interpreted as the percentage change in trade in 
response to a switch of the dummy from zero to one. That is, change from zero to one in 𝑥 implies 
a 𝛽 percent change in 𝑦. This approximation is intuitively graspable and sufficiently exact for small 
changes in the predictors of, say, ten percent or less.   
     For completeness, the exact interpretation follows from the functional form of the exponentiated 
version of the model but is less straightforward and requires additional calculations. Omitting all 
subscripts, a simple model with a (logged) continuous predictor 𝑥 and a dummy variable 𝐷 takes the 
form of ln(𝑦) = 𝛽 ln(𝑥) + 𝛽 𝐷 + 𝜀. Exponentiation yields the unlogged model 𝑦 = 𝑥 ×exp(𝛽 𝐷) × 𝜖. Thus, when 𝑥 is multiplied by a factor (1 + 𝑐), i.e., 𝑥 increases by 100𝑐 percent, 𝑦 is 
multiplied by (1 + 𝑐) . For instance, if 𝑥 increases by fifty percent, 𝑦 increases by 1.5 . The change 
in 𝑦 then is ∆𝑦 =  (1 + 𝑐) − 1, which, multiplied by 100, gives the corresponding percent change. 
Similarly when 𝐷 = 1 𝑦 is multiplied by exp(𝛽 ) with the corresponding change in 𝑦 of ∆𝑦 =exp(𝛽 ) − 1. Otherwise, when 𝐷 = 0 𝑦 is multiplied by exp(0) = 1 with an implied change of 0. 
     Based on these interpretations, it is apparent from Table 2 that a given increase in policy barriers 
of say ten percent implies an average decrease in trade of around three to six percent depending on 
the model specification. Model 2b, for instance, implies that an increase in representative foreign 
trade barriers by ten percent depresses U.S. exports by approximately 3.04 percent (the exact value 
being 1.1 . − 1 = −0.0285 = 2.85 percent. Similarly, a decrease in foreign trade barriers by ten 
percent would result in an increase of U.S. exports of around 3 percent (the exact value being 3.25 
percent)). These are substantial effects especially given that the data include a considerable share of 
trade relationships that are relatively open to trade. This implies that policy barriers in heavily pro-
tected industries can be considerably greater impediments to trade. For instance, subsetting the U.S. 
data to include only agricultural products results in estimates for the coefficients on the barrier vari-
able of –0.721 (0.057) for Model 2a and –0.434 (0.057) for Model 2b.  
     To demonstrate that the trade depressing effect of policy barriers is driven primarily by NTBs as 
opposed to tariffs, I also estimate the models with the NTB data only. For these variants of the 
models, coefficient estimates and standard errors on the barrier variable are –0.321 (0.004) and –
0.269 (0.004) for Models 1a and 1b, respectively, as well as –0.486 (0.021) and –0.234 (0.021) for 
Models 2a and 2b (the coefficient estimates for the other variables are substantively unchanged, 
which is why I do not report the results in full). Thus, coefficient estimates decrease only slightly. All 
estimates continue to be statistically significant at the .001 level. Very similar results are obtained for 
model specifications in which NTB and tariff data are both entered separately. In these cases, the 
estimated coefficients for tariffs turn out to be of small magnitude and much less stable then the 
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NTB estimates. Overall, these results help to substantiate the methodological validity and the prac-
tical importance of the estimated NTBs.  
     As the second part of this section, and to further tests the validity of the results, Table 3 presents 
some correlational and regression evidence suggesting that the non-tariff barriers estimates vary in-
tuitively with importer-industry-specific policies and characteristics.  
 
Table 3: Correlations and Regression Estimates – Tariffs, RCA, and WTO Dispute Filings  
 Tariffs RCA WTO Disputes 
Correlation .24 –.15 – 
Univariate regression + 
fixed effects 
Sign: + 
p < .001 
Sign: – 
p < .001 
– 
Poisson regression   + tar-
iffs + fixed effects 
– – Sign: + 
p < .001 
Interpretation Industries protected  
by tariffs are also  
protected by NTBs 
more competitive  
producers require  
less trade protection 
higher trade barriers 




First, estimated non-tariff barriers are positively and significantly associated with higher tariffs. Thus, 
industries that are protected by higher tariffs also tend to be protected more through non-tariff bar-
riers. This pattern makes sense, in particular, if one assumes that NTBs increasingly substitute for 
traditional tariffs in a world where tariff policies are increasingly regulated and governments need to 
resort to other less regulated – and less transparent – means to continue to shield domestic industries.  
     Second, the estimated non-tariff barriers are negatively and significantly associated with revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA), a standard measure of industry competitiveness. Again, this is in line 
with expectations given that domestic industries are most in need of protection if they are not inter-
nationally competitive and therefore particularly threatened by import competition. More productive 
domestic producers, on the other hand, have an easier time competing with foreign products and 
this require less protection.  
     Third, the estimated non-tariff barriers are positively and significantly associated with a larger 
number of WTO disputes being filed against the imposing country in the given industry. This result, 
too, conforms with expectations since foreign producers that are excluded from a given market due 
to trade protection are more likely to pressure their home governments to challenge the given barri-
ers through WTO dispute settlement.  
6     Conclusion 
This paper has presented a method to estimate the size of applied trade protection. The paper also 
provides the resulting data. These data provide comprehensive information on worldwide industry-
level non-tariff-barriers to trade (NTBs). This constitutes an important step forward towards sys-
tematically investigating trade policies around the world, given that reliable data on applied protec-
tion levels are currently not available. This is true, in particular, for non-tariff barriers, which make 
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up the bulk of trade policy tools as a result of the increasingly tight regulations on tariffs through 
international trade agreements.  
     Due to the indirect method used in the estimation process, these data are not affected by the self-
selection and coverage problems that plague existing data sources on NTBs. Unlike existing data on 
trade barriers, therefore, the data are can be used for predicting and explaining empirical trade pat-
terns and capture substantial trade depressing effects. These trade depressing effects have been doc-
umented in a separate statistical analyses. Potential applications include assessing export growth and 
market potentials, conducting welfare analyses of trade policy choices, creating predictions and sce-
narios expected from possible policy changes, and setting of negotiation priorities.  
     Given its broad applicability, the presented data is likely to be of interest to scholars and practi-
tioners alike. Furthermore, the method employed in this paper may be of interest to empirical re-
searchers and methodologists working on international trade.  
 
Table 4: Estimated NTB Ad Valorem Equivalents – Trade-weighted Averages (Selection) 
Code Category Product description AVEs.dm AVEs.ft 
H_0201 Meats Meat of bovine animals 191.2 217.4 
H_0203 
 
Meat of swine 245.1 230.4 
H_0204 
 
Meat of sheep or goats 270.5 304.0 
H_0205 
 
Meat, of horses, asses, mules or hinnies 167.8 170.1 
H_0207 
 
Meat and edible offal of poultry 178.9 200.9 
H_0701 Vegetables Potatoes 200.4 253.5 
H_0702 
 
Tomatoes 51.1 119.9 
H_0703 
 
Onions, shallots, garlic, leeks 151.1 223.6 
H_0704 
 
abbages, cauliflowers, kohlrabi, kale 183.9 254.5 
H_0705 
 
Lettuce  131.8 220.1 
H_0706 
 
Carrots, turnips, salad beetroot, etc. 239.2 329.9 
H_0707 
 
Cucumbers and gherkins 93.4 184.0 
H_0708 
 
Leguminous vegetables 265.6 315.5 
H_0801 Fruits & nuts Coconuts, Brazil nuts, and cashew nuts 29.9 41.0 
H_0802 
 
Nuts other 70.3 143.8 
H_0803 
 
Bananas 86.8 168.9 
H_0804 
 
Dates, figs, pineapples, avocados, mangoes 116.6 170.7 
H_0805 
 
Citrus  65.2 119.5 
H_0806 
 
Grapes 112.9 190.5 
H_0807 
 
Melons and papayas 18.2 91.4 
H_0808 
 
Apples, pears, and quinces 61.5 136.9 
H_0809 
 
Apricots, cherries, peaches  63.4 108.9 
H_1001 Grains Wheat 134.2 193.1 
H_1002 
 
Rye 86.5 151.1 
H_1003 
 
Barley 161.2 176.8 
H_1004 
 
Oats 332.8 362.7 
H_1005 
 
Maize (corn) 78.2 153.6 
H_1006 
 
Rice 164.8 239.3 
H_1007 
 
Grain sorghum 388.8 480.8 
H_1008 
 
Buckwheat 303.3 388.5 





Ground-nuts 103.4 164.8 
H_1202  Copra 102.4 140.3 
H_1204 
 
Oil seeds, linseed 76.3 122.0 
H_1205 
 
Rape or colza seeds 549.0 630.1 
H_1206 
 
Sunflower seeds 171.3 219.9 
I_1711 Textiles & apparel Textile fiber preparation, textile weaving   0.0 58.6 
I_1721 
 
Finishing of textiles   0.0 60.6 
I_1722 
 
Made-up textile articles, except apparel   13.2 108.1 
I_1723 
 
Carpets and rugs   16.2 109.5 
I_1729 
 
Cordage, rope, twine and netting   0.0 43.6 
I_1730 
 
Knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles   0.0 25.2 
I_1810 
 
Wearing apparel, except fur apparel   0.0 36.4 
I_1820 
 
Dressing & dyeing of fur, processing of fur   71.3 135.3 
I_1911 
 
Tanning and dressing of leather   0.0 72.6 
I_1912 
 
Luggage, handbags, etc. 0.0 58.1 
I_1920 
 
Footwear 0.0 55.0 
I_2010 Wood & paper Sawmilling and planning of wood   57.7 143.4 
I_2021 
 
Veneer sheets, plywood, particle board, etc.   0.0 90.4 
I_2022 
 
Builders’ carpentry and joinery   118.4 175.9 
I_2023 
 
Wooden containers   109.0 174.8 
I_2029 
 
Other wood products, articles of cork/straw   18.3 100.1 
I_2101 
 
Pulp, paper and paperboard   0.0 64.1 
I_2102 
 
Corrugated paper and paperboard   6.7 103.0 
I_2109 
 
Other articles of paper and paperboard   0.0 57.3 
I_2211 Printing & publishing Publishing of books and other publications   54.2 146.4 
I_2212 
 
Publishing of newspapers, journals, etc.   119.6 186.1 
I_2213 
 
Publishing of recorded media   0.0 44.8 
I_2219 
 
Other publishing   25.3 100.9 
I_2221 
 
Printing   206.1 290.5 
I_2310 Minerals & chemicals Coke oven products   403.0 458.9 
I_2320 
 
Refined petroleum products   0.0 79.9 
I_2330 
 
Processing of nuclear fuel   171.7 165.3 
I_2411 
 
Basic chemicals, except fertilizers   0.0 44.1 
I_2412 
 
Fertilizers and nitrogen compounds   94.5 188.8 
I_2413 
 
Plastics in primary forms, synthetic rubber   0.0 68.2 
I_2421 
 
Pesticides and other agro-chemical products   21.1 101.2 
I_2422 
 
Paints, varnishes, printing ink   0.7 98.5 
I_2423 
 
Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals, etc.   0.0 79.0 
I_2424 
 
Soap, cleaning & cosmetic preparations   0.0 59.5 
I_2429 
 
Other chemical products n.e.c.   0.0 47.1 
I_2430 
 
Man-made fibers   0.0 69.4 
I_2511 
 
Rubber tires and tubes   7.6 99.8 
I_2519 
 
Other rubber products   0.0 74.8 
I_2520 
 
Plastic products   0.0 54.8 
I_2610 
 
Glass and glass products   0.0 66.5 
I_2691 
 
Pottery, china and earthenware   0.0 69.8 
I_2692 
 
Refractory ceramic products   29.8 125.3 
I_2693 
 
Non-refractory clay, ceramic products   72.4 165.5 
I_2694 
 
Cement, lime, and plaster   158.3 253.7 
I_2695 
 





Cutting, shaping & finishing of stone   132.2 202.8 
I_2710 Metal & machinery Basic iron and steel   0.0 54.3 
I_2720 
 
Basic precious and non-ferrous metals   0.0 43.9 
I_2811 
 
Structural metal products   19.2 114.1 
I_2812 
 
Tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal   74.1 165.4 
I_2813 
 
Steam generators   121.2 208.4 
I_2893 
 
Metal forging/pressing/stamping/roll-forming   0.0 91.5 
I_2899 
 
Treatment & coating of metals   0.0 37.9 
I_2911 
 
Engines & turbines (not for transport equipm.) 55.0 123.4 
I_2912 
 
Pumps, compressors, taps, and valves   0.0 35.6 
I_2913 
 
Bearings, gears, gearing & driving elements   0.0 67.2 
I_2914 
 
Ovens, furnaces and furnace burners   0.0 57.4 
I_2915 
 
Lifting and handling equipment   0.0 56.6 
I_2921 
 
Agricultural and forestry machinery   6.1 96.6 
I_2922 
 
Machine tools   0.0 47.0 
I_2923 
 
Machinery for metallurgy   23.1 100.0 
I_2924 
 
Machinery for mining & construction   0.0 44.4 
I_2925 
 
Food/beverage/tobacco processing machinery   3.4 89.6 
I_2926 
 
Machinery for textile, apparel and leather   0.0 56.7 
I_2927 
 
Weapons and ammunition   220.3 301.8 
I_2930 
 
Domestic appliances n.e.c.   0.0 70.0 
I_3000 Electronics & prec. instr.  Office, accounting and computing machinery 0.0 47.2 
I_3110 
 
Electric motors, generators and transformers   0.0 64.5 
I_3120 
 
Electricity distribution & control apparatus   0.0 47.9 
I_3130 
 
Insulated wire and cable   0.0 58.2 
I_3140 
 
Accumulators, primary cells, and batteries   0.0 73.0 
I_3150 
 
Lighting equipment and electric lamps   0.0 57.8 
I_3210 
 
Electronic valves, tubes, etc.   0.0 65.4 
I_3220 
 
TV/radio transmitters, line comm. apparatus   0.0 38.5 
I_3230 
 
TV and radio receivers and associated goods   0.0 83.1 
I_3311 
 
Medical, surgical and orthopedic equipment   0.0 56.7 
I_3312 
 
Measuring/testing/navigating appliances, etc.   0.0 53.7 
I_3313 
 
Industrial process control equipment   0.9 78.9 
I_3320 
 
Optical instruments & photographic equipment   0.0 43.3 
I_3330 
 
Watches and clocks   0.0 66.4 
I_3410 Transport equipment Motor vehicles   18.4 96.9 
I_3420 
 
Automobile bodies, trailers & semi-trailers   14.8 107.8 
I_3430 
 
Parts/accessories for automobiles   0.0 83.3 
I_3511 
 
Building and repairing of ships   68.7 133.9 
I_3512 
 
Building/repairing of pleasure/sport. boats   16.4 84.9 
I_3520 
 
Railway/tramway locomotives & rolling stock   50.7 117.5 
I_3530 
 
Aircraft and spacecraft   0.0 88.3 
I_3591 
 
Motorcycles  74.0 141.5 
I_3592 
 
Bicycles and invalid carriages   18.7 68.3 
I_4500 Services Construction 334.3 263.1 
I_6200 
 
Air transport 2.1 43.3 
I_6500 
 
Financial intermediation 123.5 193.0 
I_6600 
 
Insurance and pension funding 117.1 129.6 
I_7200 
 
Computer and related activities 122.1 153.3 
I_7300 
 





Public administration and defense 462.7 124.8 
I_9200 
 
Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 273.7 257.8 
 
Note: Product codes beginning with ‘H’ refer to the HS classification; codes beginning with ‘I’ refer to the ISIC 
Rev. 3 classification. The NTB ad valorem equivalents are reported in percent.  
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